Justice for whom? What will Justice look like in the context of the Boko Haram insurgency? The quagmire of securing justice is illustrated by a scoping paper by the Centre for Democracy and Development Policy, Prospects for Transitional Justice Initiative in North East Nigeria. However, what is at stake today goes beyond negotiation and asks the fundamental question of Justice. However, while a ceasefire has not been negotiated, it is important to point out that the Nigerian government has twice negotiatedfor the release of the Chibok girls with both the two splinter groups of the insurgents. However, what is important to point out is that the insurgents have consistently maintained that they do not need amnesty, will never engage in dialogue, and will not stop fighting until an Islamic state is established in Nigeria. This was followed by the Ahmed Datti-led initiative, the Galtimari Committee, the bizarre and possibly fraudulent Stephen Davies negotiation, Idris Deby’s facilitated negotiation, and others. Babakura was killed24 hours after the meeting. The first of such initiative was spearheaded by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2011, when he made a visit to Maiduguri, Bornu state, and met with Babakura Fugu, an in-law of Mohammad Yusuf. There have been several concerted attempts at resolving the insurgency through political negotiation. Boko Haram has proved adaptable, using varying recruitment strategies, including forced conscription, abduction, blackmail, indoctrination, loan schemes, etc. However, attempts at peace or reconciliation must also take into account the difficult nature of the insurgency.
For instance, in Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria–all hugely impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency–there are ongoing deradicalisation and reintegration programs for ex-combatants. Nevertheless, the call for a negotiated peace and reconciliation remains strong. These include six possible cases against Boko Haram and two against the Nigerian security forces.
The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (“OTP”) has identified eight possible cases of crimes against humanity in relation to the conflict in northeastern Nigeria. Likewise, the Nigerian military is accusedof committing gross human rights violations in the course of its involvement in conflicts in the region the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)–the paramilitary force helping government forces in prosecuting the war against insurgency–has also been accused of committing war crimes against civilians and Boko Haram insurgents. The intensity of the violence as led the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to declare the conflict between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram insurgents to be a non-international armed conflict. Since 2009, the insurgents have engaged in gross human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, rapes, slavery, abductions, and willful destruction of civilian property, as well as many others. The Nigerian government continues to declare victories over the group, which is now split in two: into the Shekau faction and the Islamic State-aligned Al Barnawi faction. The Boko Haram insurgency is now in its eighth year. What Is Justice? Exploring the Need for Accountability in the Boko Haram Insurgency